Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other electronic commerce applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more efficiently. However, motivating the agents to abide to a solution requires careful analysis: only some of the solutions are stable in the sense that no group of agents is motivated to break off and form a new coalition. This constraint has been studied extensively in cooperative game theory. However, the computational questions around this constraint have received less attention. When it comes to coalition formation among software agents (that represent real-world parties), these questions become increasingly explicit.
INTRODUCTION
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more efficiently. However, motivating the agents to abide to a solution requires careful analysis: only some of the solutions are stable in the sense that no group of agents is motivated to break off and form a new coalition. This constraint has been studied extensively in cooperative game theory. However, the computational questions around this constraint have received less attention. When it comes to coalition formation among software agents (that represent real-world parties), these questions become increasingly explicit.
The determination of stable solutions has electronic commerce applications beyond automated negotiation as well. For example, consider a large number of companies, some subsets of which could form profitable virtual organizations that can respond to larger or more diverse orders than the individual companies can. Determining stable value divisions allows one to see which potential virtual organizations would be viable in the sense that the companies in the virtual organization would naturally stay together. As another example, consider a future online service that determines how much each employee of a company should be paid so that the company does not collapse as a result of employees being bought away by other companies. The input to this service would be how much subsets of the company's employees would be paid if they left collectively (for instance, a whole department could be bought away). This input could come from salary databases or a manager's estimate. The computational problem of determining a stable renumeration would be crucial for such a service. Both of these example problems fit exactly under the model that we study in this paper.
DEFINITIONS FROM COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY
In this section we review standard definitions from cooperative game theory, which we will use throughout the paper. In the definitions, we follow the most prevalent advanced textbook in microeconomics [2] .
DEFINITION 1. Given a set of players A, a utility possibility vector u
B for B = {b1, . . . , bn B } ⊆ A is a vector (u b 1 , . .
. , u bn B ) representing utilities that the players in B
can guarantee themselves by cooperating with each other. A utility possibility set is a set of utility possibility vectors for a given set B.
DEFINITION 2. A game in characteristic form consists of a set of players A and a utility possibility set
It is commonly assumed that the joining of two coalitions does not prevent them from acting as well as they could have acted separately-this assumption is known as superadditivity.
In this paper, we study only the best known solution concept, which is called the core. It was first introduced by Gillies [1] .
(In the case of transferable utility, this is equivalent to saying that the outcome is blocked by
In general, the core can be empty. (E.g. the game with players {x, y, z}, where we have the utility possibility vectors u {x,y} = (2, 1), u {y,z} = (2, 1), and u {x,z} = (1, 2) (and the ones that can be derived from this through superadditivity); the same game with transferable utility also has an empty core.) If the core is empty, the game is inherently unstable because no matter what outcome is chosen, some subset of agents is motivated to pull out and form their own coalition. In the rest of this paper, we will study the question of how complex it is to determine whether the core is nonemptyarguably the most basic strategic assessment of the game.
REPRESENTING CHARACTERISTIC FORM GAMES CONCISELY
We study a natural representation that can capture any characteristic form game. Conciseness in our representation stems only from the fact that in many settings, the synergies among coalitions are sparse. When a coalition introduces no new synergy, its utility possibility vectors can be derived using superadditivity. Therefore, the input needs to include only the utility possibility vectors of coalitions that introduce synergy. Bi, (Bi, u B 
To avoid senseless cases that have no outcomes, we also require that ({a}, (0)) ∈ W for all a ∈ A. DEFINITION 7. We represent a game in characteristic form with transferable utility by a set of players A, and a set of values W = {(B, v(B) )}. The value for a given B ⊆ A is then given by v(B) = max{ 1≤i≤r v(Bi) : 1≤i≤r Bi = B, all the Bi are disjoint, and for all the Bi, (Bi, v(Bi)) ∈ W }. To avoid senseless cases that have no outcomes, we also require that ({a}, 0) ∈ W whenever {a} does not receive a value elsewhere in W .
The following lemmas show we can use this representation effectively for checking whether an outcome is in the core. 
COMPLEXITY RESULTS
We first show that with this representation, it is hard to check whether the core is nonempty, both for the nontransferable utility setting and for the transferable utility setting.
DEFINITION 8 (CORE-NONEMPTY). We are given a superadditive game in characteristic form (with or without transferable utility) in our representation language. We are asked whether the core is nonempty.
Our proofs that CORE-NONEMPTY is hard rely on constructing instances where it is difficult to determine what the grand coalition can accomplish. The next two theorems show that if this is known, the problem becomes easy. So it is the collaborative optimization problem that makes the problem hard, not the strategic interaction. THEOREM 3. When V (A) is explicitly provided, CORE-NONEMPTY without transferable utility is in P.
THEOREM 4. When v(A) is explicitly provided, CORE-NONEMPTY with transferable utility is in P.
The algorithms in the proofs also construct a solution that is in the core, if the core is nonempty.
However, if we allow for hybrid games, where only some coalitions (in particular, the grand coalition) can transfer utility among themselves, the hardness returns, now due to the strategic interaction.
THEOREM 5. When only the grand coalition can transfer utility, CORE-NONEMPTY is N P-complete, even when v(A) is explicitly provided as input.
